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FOCUS ON
Critical Psychiatry
Abstract
Critical psychiatry appraises and comments upon psychiatric services as they are usually provided. This article,
prompted by the publication of a recent book, considers the place of critical psychiatry historically and in the context
of contemporary mental health care and treatment.
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several of the authors contributing to Critical
Psychiatry: The Limits of Madness and other related
publications (for example, Thomas and Bracken
2004) attempt to distinguish between critical
psychiatry and anti-psychiatry, the Critical Psychiatry
Network’s website gives links to some 17 sites and
organisations that are openly critical of conventional
psychiatric practice. The book and other publications
by critical psychiatrists pull no punches with their
views of a biomedical approach to mental health
problems (for example, Moncrieff & Kirsch, 2005).
This cannot enhance understanding and support
from among those whose daily tasks are to service
and maintain mainstream services. Writing in the
Times Higher Education Supplement (April 21 2006)
Adam James describes Double’s suspension from his
NHS post for six months during 2000 as ’a response
to the perceived threat that psychiatrists like him are
seen to be by the biomedical hegemony gripping
contemporary psychiatric practice’.
The term ’critical psychiatry’ was probably first
seen in print as the title of David Ingleby’s book,
initially published in 1981. This is a collection of
essays effectively drawing attention to the
shortcomings of a simple, positivist approach to the
issue of ’mental health difficulties’. Ingleby and his
co-contributors further develop the view that mental
illness is most usefully seen from a political
perspective. To a large extent this was a re-statement
of the more celebrated anti-psychiatry sentiments of
the 1960s – Laing, Cooper, Berke and Szasz. In their
respective turns, Laing, Ingleby and Double have
all been subject to what could be regarded as
’suppression’. The anti-psychiatry movement with
which Laing was (perhaps inaccurately) associated was
Last year saw publication of Critical Psychiatry: The
Limits of Madness (Double, 2006). Given recent
policy statements such as the White Paper,Our
Health, Our Care, Our Say (Department of Health
(DH), 2006a), the Office of the Deputy Prime
Minister’s report,Mental Health and Social Exclusion
(Social Exclusion Unit, 2004), and England’s chief
nursing officer’s review of mental health nursing,
From Values to Action (DH, 2006b), this was timely.
Recent years have also seen support for policy
implementation in the form of National Institute for
Mental Health in England/Care Services
Improvement Partnership (NIMHE/CSIP)
programmes influencing, inter alia, mental health
service provision for those from black and minority
ethnic groups, acute inpatient care, professional roles
and responsibilities, and access to psychological
therapies. All of these are set to facilitate change in
mental health service practices and philosophy in
ways that resonate strongly with the positions
adopted by critical psychiatry’s proponents.
Unfortunately it is difficult to find a connection
between these service developments, and critical
psychiatry or other theoretical accounts. This robs
those attempting to achieve change in mainstream
settings of the support that a coherent conceptual
framework can provide, and it threatens to rob those
championing a shift towards a more humanitarian
approach of support from mainstream practitioners.
Despite being frequently critical of certain
traditional mental health practices, policy documents
and NIMHE/CSIP publications avoid explicit
reference to, or criticism of, the intellectual and
conceptual underpinnings of them. Where there is
resistance to change, this can legitimise it. However
largely discredited during the 1970s and 1980s, and
although a popular cult figure during the zenith of his
working life, Laing and the ideas he promulgated have
never found widespread application in mainstream
mental health services. According to Double, Ingleby
was overtly passed over for preferment in Cambridge
by the inaugural university professor of psychiatry and
first president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, Sir
Martin Roth. I have already made reference to
Double’s own suspension for ’retraining’, which he
refers to himself in the book. Perhaps there are good
reasons why psychiatry’s political dimension should
not be ignored.
Critical psychiatry and critical
realism
In his book, which introduces the term ’critical
psychiatry’, Ingleby acknowledges this use of the term
’critical’ as a link to (though not synonymous with)
its use in relation to critical theory (Horkheimer &
Adorno, commented upon in Tar, 1977). This in turn
shares philosophic underpinnings with Bhaskar’s
critical realism (Bhaskar 1975), which is attracting
increasing interest as an epistemology suited to the
study of mental health and its related practices (Ellis,
1992; Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999; Houston, 2001;
Littlejohn, 2003; Pilgrim and Rogers, 2005; Stickley,
2006; Middleton & Shaw, 2007). Critical realism
provides a position from which the contributions of
differing perspectives can all be acknowledged but at
the same time recognised as providing only a partial
explanation of the object of study constrained by their
individual context and methods. Thus, there may be
some validity in a biomedical/illness model of some
features of some types of emotional or psychological
distress but these will always also have psychological,
social, political, economic and spiritual dimensions,
which cannot be explained or manipulated without
attention to the relevant dimension.
Critical psychiatry echoes this approach. It
promotes the view that no one of the very many
theoretical, research and/or therapeutic approaches
that might fall under a wide umbrella of mental
health research, psychiatry, mental health practice
and mental health services can be expected, on its
own, to provide the basis of an all-embracing theory
or a universally effective family of therapeutic
interventions. Instead, critical psychiatry draws
attention to the shortcomings of such claims by
theorists and practitioners alike. It argues that mental
health practice and services should acknowledge the
critically appraised value of neurobiological,
psychological, social, economic, political and spiritual
determinants of wellbeing, their vagaries and the
techniques and institutions employed to mitigate
them. Criticism per se is reserved for the influences
of a dominant biomedical hegemony and abuses of
power; attention perhaps to the political and
economic dimensions of the subject.
Recovery
Another development in mental health circles that
reflects this ’the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts’ perspective is that of attempts to conceptualise
and facilitate ’recovery’. Currently the term is being
used in a variety of ways, and there are some
intimations that these might include an obfuscation
with the remission of symptoms (Andreasen et al
2005), perhaps with a view to the psycho-
pharmaceutical market. For others, and perhaps more
legitimately, this use of the term refers to the
recovery of a state of self-actualisation, autonomy and
relative existential stability, grounded in and reflecting
lived experience, rather than a symptoms rating scale
(Deegan 1988). At its simplest an analogy can be
made with the ’recovery’ of someone who has
suffered a spinal injury, perhaps as a result of an
accident, who does not and will not recover the
ability to walk once again, but who can recover their
humanity and senses of self and self-worth as an
effective wheelchair user and, possibly, a para-athlete.
In the context of mental health difficulties this
might mean acquiring the ability to live with the
experience of sometimes-intrusive voices, knowledge
of one’s own emotional liability or undue sensitivity
to criticism. Recovery in this sense means more than
just successful biomedical treatment; it refers to
concomitant psychological, social, economic, political
and spiritual developments which, as a critical realist
perspective insists, need not depend upon the first or
even one another in any identifiably causal manner.
Acknowledging that the holistic concept of
’recovery’ is the appropriate therapeutic goal rather
than the relief of symptoms challenges many
orthodoxies in the way that critical psychiatry does.
It directs attention from the view that an individual’s
mental health difficulties can be somehow wholly
understood in terms of a diagnosis or some other
form of classification, and towards a need to
understand the problems posed by an individual
suffering from emotional or psychological difficulties,
not as ’a case of…’, but as a singular human being
with a potentially identifiable and probably complex
set of needs and difficulties.
In their book Repper and Perkins (2003) outline
what this might entail. They emphasise the need for
an approach that builds on strengths rather than one
that focuses upon the eradication of symptoms and
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the identification of deficits. The wide gulf between
professionals’ practices and perspectives and the lived
experience of mental health difficulties is identified as
a barrier to setting therapeutic endeavour in the
context of a hope-inspiring, supportive relationship.
Political, social and economic determinants of social
exclusion are seen not as ’unfortunate but inevitable
consequences of mental illness’, but as powerful and
potentially remediable contributors to continuing
disability and dependency in their own right.
Critical practice
If the aspirations of a recovery-oriented approach to
providing mental health services are to be realised,
practitioners of all backgrounds are called upon to
address some fairly challenging issues. Allott (2005)
identifies 12 principles of a recovery-oriented
approach to mental health service provision derived
from experiences in Ohio (Townsend et al, 1999).
Among these are:
 the service user directs the recovery process
 the mental health system must be aware of its
tendency to enable and encourage service user
dependency
 there is a need to merge all intervention models,
including medical, psychological, social and
recovery
 clinicians’ initial emphasis on ’hope’ and the
ability to develop trusting relationships influences
service users’ recovery
 family involvement may enhance the recovery
process. The service user defines his/her family.
How well are current practices fit for these purposes
– to allow service users to direct their management,
avoid paternalism and dependency by
accommodating risk-taking, prioritise trusting
relationships between clinicians and their clientele,
and explicitly involve family and friends?
Contemporary mental health practices and the
services that support them are as much a product of
their historical origins as any other form of human
activity. Fulford (2003) points to the history of
twentieth century psychiatry as ’a history of fashions
– psychoanalysis, community care, narrowly
conceived “biological” psychiatry, [which] all started
as good ideas that, lacking the perspective of history,
deteriorated into ideologies’.
The need to provide for those who have become
confused, distressed, threatening, dangerous or
suicidal is a task all societies face and each has and
does do so in ways that reflect their wider context.
The last two centuries of British history have seen
passage through the provisions of the Poor Laws,
entry into the workhouse, certification as insane
and admission to a mental hospital, asylum or state
institution, various forms of psychotherapy and, over
the last half century or so, ’treatment of a mental
illness’. At any particular point in time and place
the prevailing social construct of uncontainable
emotional and/or psychological excess, and how
to respond to it, are emergent properties of the
prevalent social, political and professional climate.
The experiences and expectations of the distressed
and those empathic with them are not so arbitrarily
determined. Intense anxiety, despair, anger, fear and
confusion are universal qualities of human
experience. Historically mental health services have
been ’what society provides’, determined as much
by prevalent ideologies, politics and economic
constraints as they have been by the immanent
needs of those they serve.
Recognising the contextual determinants of
professional and institutional practices is, of course,
an expression of critical theory. Critical theorising
leads to critical thinking. Critical thinking leads to
critical actions, and these in turn to critical practice
(Adams et al, 2002). Respect for the influence of
context upon practitioners’ actions also lies at the
heart of Donald Schön’s (1983) work, The Reflective
Practitioner. Schön does not explicitly base his
theorising upon critical theory but he does refer to
the related philosophical analysis of the sociology of
knowledge (Mannheim, 1936), itself the basis of
Foucault’s criticism of prevailing views of madness
(Foucault & Khalfa, 2006).
Schön focuses upon the distinctions and tensions
between what he dubs ’technical rationality’ and
’reflection-in-action’. In essence the former refers to
formalised professional knowledge, analyses and
related practices and institutions, and the latter to
the realities of conducting a piece of work in an
identified context. His book reviews some of the
issues raised by this contrast as it operated in the
activities of a consulting architect, psychotherapy
supervision, engineering design, scientific
investigation, town planning and management. For
each of these situations he illustrates how the
practitioner’s formally acquired knowledge of their
subject operates not as an immutable framework of
problems definition and repertoire of solutions, but
as a reservoir of informed experience. He shows how
practice in action is a creative process drawing upon,
but not defined by, that reservoir. In this way his
work endorses a refreshing shift in institutional and
explanatory power from the profession to the
individual practitioner.
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In the context of a mental health service this
perspective gives precedence to creative problem
solving over presumptive professionally or
institutionally defined procedures and protocols.
Along with the views of the Critical Psychiatry
Network it respects the view that it is not sufficient
to regard anyone as ’a case of…’ to be managed
exclusively by algorithm. It embraces fundamental
tenets of a ’recovery’ approach in that it focuses
upon the need to engage with all the particulars of
an individual rather than a selected, professionally
defined subset. From an epistemological point of view
it is consistent with critical theory in that it formally
acknowledges the contextual nature of knowledge and
solutions. If a person might benefit from cognitive
behaviour therapy it is no solution simply to put them
on a long waiting list, just because that is what the
book says they should have and the practitioner has
no power to make cognitive behaviour therapy more
readily available. The contextually defined solution will
have to be one that makes optimal use of what is
available, even though it might not be precisely what
the research evidence recommends. What good is
there in withholding all support from someone who
does not ’fulfil referral criteria’ when there may be
some things could be usefully offered?
To conclude
Quite rightly critical psychiatry is critical of psychiatry
as it is generally practised and provided; it would be
remarkable indeed if psychiatry were entirely beyond
reproach. The form this criticism takes is intellectually
and professionally challenging, particularly as it
questions frequently unquestioned assumptions, such
as psychiatry’s political and economic contexts.
Nevertheless it also complements other
developments in mental health theory and practice
which ask and attempt to answer similar questions,
and points a way towards a more congenial,
rewarding and honest description of what mental
health practitioners actually do and might achieve.
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